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Abstract
We investigate the information content of aggregate stock market liquidity and ask
whether it may be a useful realtime indicator, both for nancial stress, and real economic
activity in Norway. We describe the development in a set of liquidity proxies at the Oslo
Stock Exchange (OSE) for the period 1980-2008, with particular focus on crisis period 2007
through 2008, showing how market liquidity and trading activity changed for the whole
market as well as for individual industry sectors. We also evaluate the predictive power of
market liquidity for economic growth both in-sample and out-of-sample.
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1Introduction
In nance, liquidity is a concept with many interpretations, and many uses. Following the recent
nancial crisis there has been a huge increase in research on liquidity related topics both with
respect to macro liquidity, funding liquidity, the liquidity of dierent asset classes and markets
as well as the ow of funds between dierent assets and markets.
In this paper we look at the link between equity market liquidity and the real economy. In
the discussion of the current nancial crisis, much attention has been on the apparent casual
eect from a dry up in the liquidity of nancial assets to the crisis of the economy. Ns et al.
[2009b] show that such links between aggregate stock market liquidity and the macro economy
are not new, rather, they have been a stable feature of the US stock market at least since the
Second World War. They show, using data for the US from 1947 through 2008, that equity
market liquidity is a very good leading indicator of the real economy. We look at similar issues
using data from the Norwegian equity market (Oslo Stock Exchange { OSE). We examine the
liquidity of the Norwegian equity market represented by the stocks listed on the OSE over the
period 1980 through 2008.
The goal of this study is twofold. First, we give a general descriptive analysis of the liquidity
and trading activity of the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) for the period 1980 through 2008,1 with
particular focus on the crisis period 2007-2008. With respect to the crisis we examine how
liquidity and trading activity changed through the crisis for the market as a whole, across
important rm risk characteristics (mainly rm size) and for individual industry sectors.
Secondly, we examine in more detail to what degree market liquidity is informative about fu-
ture economic conditions in Norway.2 We perform an in-sample analysis where market liquidity
is used as a predictor of macroeconomic aggregates such as growth in real GDP, unemploy-
ment, credit, consumption and investments. We also do Granger causality tests between the
variables, as well as out-of-sample evaluations of simple linear forecasting models where we ex-
amine whether liquidity might be of use for predicting macro conditions in real time. In both
the in-sample and out-of-sample analysis we compare the performance of market liquidity to
other nancial predictors.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We start by a brief overview of the current research
on equity market liquidity and its links with the macroeconomy before we in section 2 describe
the data and the construction of our liquidity measures. In section 3 we provide some descriptive
statistics for the variables and examine the time series development in liquidity across the whole
sample period 1980-2008 with particular focus on the crisis period. In section 4 we examine the
predictive ability of liquidity for several macroeconomic variables both in-sample and out-of-
sample. We also examine the causality relation between liquidity and macroeconomic variables.
Finally, in section 5 we summarize the results.
1This part of the project builds on the analysis in Ns et al. [2008a], extending the time series and looking in
more detail at the crisis period 2005-2008.
2This is essentially an extension of Ns et al. [2009b] who focus mainly on the US market. In this paper, we
take a closer look at the Norwegian market.
21 Research on equity market liquidity and the macro economy
There is a long history of research on the liquidity and microstructure of equity markets. The
early research on equity market liquidity was however done within a market microstructure
framework focusing on intra-day patterns and trader behavior in single securities. In recent
years there has been an increased focus on the broader implications of the market microstructure
for the cross section of asset prices. Most of the attention of this literature has been on asset
pricing implications of liquidity.3
Research that links the liquidity of the stock market and the real economy is however much
more scarce. There are only a few studies that examine this relationship, and the typical ques-
tion asked in these studies is whether macroeconomic variables aect stock market liquidity.
For example, using data from the US stock market over the 1962-2001 period, Fujimoto [2003]
employs a VAR approach to investigate if time varying aggregate stock market liquidity has
macroeconomic sources. The main conclusion of her study is that \market liquidity has be-
come more resilient to both market-level and economy-wide shocks." Shocks in some nominal
macroeconomic variables (ination and monetary policy variables) are found to aect aggregate
liquidity, but only in the years before the mid 1980's when the business cycle dynamics was
more volatile. A similar analysis is done for Scandinavian countries in S oderberg [2008] where
he nds similar results. Goyenko and Ukhov [2009] also examine how bond market liquidity
and equity market liquidity is linked. More specically, they examine whether changes in the
liquidity in the two markets is driven by shocks to real and nominal macro variables. They
nd that monetary policy shocks and shocks to ination impact both bond and stock market
liquidity, while shocks in real variables (industrial production) they nd have no eect on the
liquidity of either the US bond- or equity markets.
None of these studies nd any eect from shocks in real economic variables to market
liquidity, which is not surprising, since they actually do not test for a causality relation from
market liquidity to real variables. This causality direction was rst investigated in Ns et al.
[2009b], who examine the hypothesis that equity liquidity is informative about future real
economic variables. They nd that average market liquidity have predictive power for future
growth in real GDP, unemployment, investments and consumption for the period 1947-2008
in the US. The conjecture in Ns et al. is that the time variation in market liquidity is
related to portfolio rebalancing caused by changing risk preferences and expectations about
future investment opportunities. Thus, market liquidity changes as investors move wealth out of
equities into other asset classes (e.g. bonds or cash) and vice versa. They also show evidence that
this eect also occur within equities, between e.g. large rms and small rms. Their argument
is related to the literature on forecasting economic growth using asset prices, where the forward
looking nature of asset markets suggest that, as long as expectations about the economy is not
biased on average, shocks to expectations about relevant real variables should be reected in
3For some well known examples of such studies on the US market we refer to Pastor and Stambaugh [2003]
and Acharya and Pedersen [2005]. This literature has recently been summarized in Amihud et al. [2005]. For an
investigation of the Norwegian market see Ns et al. [2009a].
3prices and risk premia. However, since liquidity is not an asset price, the expected cash ow
argument does not apply directly. Their suggested explanation is that the time variation in
aggregate liquidity reects transactions investors do today to hedge their perceived consumption
risk tomorrow. In a standard Merton [1973] consumption-portfolio decision problem, these
trades would constitute hedging demand related to state variables that forecast changes in the
investment-opportunity set. Thus, when a large number of investors move out of equities, the
cost of trading equities changes, as there are potentially fewer liquidity suppliers left. To support
their conjecture Ns et al. show, using ownership data for Norway, that market liquidity is
correlated with the number of investors moving in and out of the market.
In practice, there are several dynamic asset allocation strategies that shift wealth between
stocks and bond markets. During times of economic distress such strategies causes rebalancing
towards less risky and more liquid securities. Consistent with this, Beber et al. [2008] nd
that equity market order-ow across equity sectors at dierent stages of the business cycle is
consistent with a sector-rotation strategy where investors re-balance their portfolios into sectors
that is perceived as having better relative performance at dierent stages of the business cycle.4
Similarly, Kaul and Kayacetin [2009] nd that aggregate equity market order-ow is informative
about future macro fundamentals. They show that there is a portfolio shift from small stocks
to large stocks prior to economic downturns, and argue that this is a consequence of an increase
in market-wide risk aversion. Albuquerque et al. [2007] show that there is a close relationship
between liquidity and order-ow. Their results suggest that variation in market-wide order-ow
is mainly due to liquidity co-movement and not related to measures of private information.
Their results may indicate that the results in Beber et al. [2008] and Kaul and Kayacetin [2009]
may be explained by market liquidity rather than private information.
Thus, if investors have rational (or at least unbiased) expectations, and rebalance their
portfolios over the business cycle, one implication is that liquidity should have predictive power
for real economic variables that are important for rms earnings and risks. As investors move
out of an asset, liquidity in that asset should fall as participation falls. In support of this,
Gibson and Mougeot [2004] nd evidence that a time varying liquidity risk premium in the US
stock market is related to a recession index over the 1973-1997 period.
Similarly, several studies within the empirical asset pricing literature suggest that also other
risk factors that explain the cross-section of stock returns are linked to future economic growth,
see Liew and Vassalou [2000] and Vassalou [2003]. Several papers nd support for a \ight-to-
quality" or \ight-to-liquidity" during economic downturns. Longsta [2004] nds that there is a
ight-to-liquidity premium in Treasury bond prices, and that the premium is related to changes
in consumer condence and ows into equity and money market mutual funds. Goyenko and
Sarkissian [2008] develop and test an international asset pricing model using the relative spread
on US Treasury bonds as a proxy for a joint ight-to-liquidity/ight-to-quality risk factor.
Results from asset pricing tests show that there is a signicant risk premium related to a bond
illiquidity factor.
4Their results suggest that fund ows into the materials sector predict future economic growth, while ows
into nancials, telecom and consumer discretionaries predict lower economic growth one year ahead.
4There are several studies that suggest that nancial variables contain information about
future economic growth. Fama [1981], Fama [1990] and Schwert [1990] all nd a strong positive
relation between real stock returns and future production growth rates in the US. Fama argues
that stock returns are determined by forecasts of relevant real variables and that the relation
between current stock returns and future production growth reects market expectations about
future cash ows that is impounded in stock prices. Also, Liew and Vassalou [2000] and Vassalou
[2003] nd strong evidence that the Fama [1993] size (SMB) and value (HML) risk factors contain
signicant information about future GDP growth. Fama-French argue that the size and value
factors act as state variables that predict future changes in the investment opportunity set in
the context of the intertemporal asset pricing model of Merton [1973]. The results in Liew and
Vassalou [2000] to a large extend strengthen this argument. In addition, Harvey [1988], Estrella
and Hardouvelis [1991] and Estrella and Trubin [2006] nd that the slope of the yield curve
predict real economic variables such as consumption and investment growth. Also, Bernanke
[1990] and more recently Gilchrist et al. [2009] nd that the credit spread has predictive power
for economic growth.
Overall, there is a number of studies that suggest that nancial market variables lead macro
variables as shocks to expectations about future investment opportunities causes prices to change
to new equilibrium levels. This is the same story proposed in Ns et al. [2009b] with respect
to liquidity. If shocks to expectations generate order-ow and alters trading activity between
assets with dierent risk characteristics, this could provide an explanation for why we observe
commonality in liquidity. Furthermore, if this is the case, one would also expect liquidity to
predict macroeconomic growth.
2 Liquidity measures and data
The empirical literature on market microstructure have developed a large number of empirical
measures of liquidity. This plethora of empirical measures to some degree reect that there
are numerous theoretical denitions of liquidity. In this article we look at a few commonly
used measures of liquidity, and refer to Ns et al. [2008a] for an examination of a broader
range of liquidity measures for the Oslo Stock Exchange. In this section we briey explain the
construction of the liquidity measures used and list the data sources.
2.1 Liquidity proxies
Our choices of liquidity measures are driven by our need for for reasonably long time series so
we cover as many business cycles as possible. Many common liquidity measures require high
frequency trading information, which is not available for long periods. We therefore employ
measures which can be calculated using data at the lower frequency of daily observations. In
our analysis we will focus on two much used measures of liquidity; the relative bid/ask spread
(RS) and the Amihud [2002] liquidity ratio (ILR). In addition we will examine turnover as a
measure of trading activity. Thus, our three measures capture the implicit cost of trading a
5small volume (spread), the average price impact of observed transactions (ILR), and the trading
activity (turnover).
Our rst liquidity measure is the relative spread. A spread is the dierence between a bid
and ask price. Spread costs are observed in dealer markets as well as in limit order markets,
and there are several empirical variations of spread measures available including quoted spread,
relative quoted spread, eective spread, and amortized spread. The quoted bid/ask spread is
simply the dierence between the best ask quote and the best bid quote. The midpoint between
the best bid and ask quotes is often used as an estimate of the true value of the security. The
relative bid/ask spread, RS, is the quoted spread as a fraction of the midpoint price, and provides
a relative measure of trading costs, what fraction of the price needs to be paid to \cross" from
the bid to the ask price, or vice versa. A high spread indicate an illiquid market where the
implicit costs of trading is large.
Our second liquidity measure is a measure of the elasticity dimension of liquidity. Elasticity
measures of liquidity try to take into account how much prices move as a response to trading
volume (i.e. price impact). Thus, cost measures and elasticity measures are related. Kyle [1985]
denes price impact as the response of price to order ow. Amihud proposes a price impact
measure that is closely related to Kyle's measure, which we employ in our analysis. The Amihud







where DT is the number of trading days within a time window T, jRi;tj is the absolute return on
day t for security i, and VOLi;t is the trading volume (in NOK) on day t. The Amihud measure
is calculated over dierent time intervals, such as days, months or quarters. It is standard to
multiply the estimate by 106 for practical purposes. The Amihud measure is called an illiquidity
measure since a high estimate indicates low liquidity (high price impact of trades). Thus, the
ILR measure captures how much the price moves for each NOK unit of trades. Moreover, a
high price impact suggest that the market depth is low, such that a smaller volume is needed
to move the price.
As mentioned earlier, there are many proposed proxies for liquidity in the literature. We
focus on the Amihud illiquidity ratio (ILR) and relative spread (RS). The ILR measure is shown
by Goyenko et al. [2009] to be among the best proxies for price impact for long time series
when intra-day based liquidity measures are not available. There are also several alternative
estimators for various spread measures, however since we observe the closing spread directly we
do not examine alternative spread proxies.
Stock turnover is measure very much related to liquidity. Turnover is a common measure of
activity, and is calculated as the total number of shares traded during a time interval, relative
to the number of outstanding shares in the security. We usually express turnover in percentage
terms. Thus, turnover measures the percentage of the issued shares that changes hands during
a trading window (e.g. day, month, quarter). Turnover is a measure that reect the trading
activity in the market scaled by the number of issued shares. In general one thinks about an
6active market as a liquid market where it is easy to liquidate or rebalance a portfolio. On the
other hand, an increase in turnover does not always mean that it a stock has low trading costs.
It may also reect that investors are willing to pay a high cost to liquidate or rebalance their
portfolios. This point was rst made by Aitken and Comerton-Forde [2003] who show that,
especially during crisis periods, turnover has a tendency to high at the same time as transaction
costs are high (liquidity low). Thus, so-called trade-based liquidity measures should be used
with caution as they may give wrong signals about liquidity in certain periods.
A second measure of trading activity is the number of trading days. This measure is simply
calculated by counting the number of days during a time period, such as a quarter or a year,
that the stock in question traded (had trading volume larger than zero).
2.2 Equity data
The data we use in the analysis is obtained from the OSE data service (OBI).5 The data covers
the period from 1980 through 2008. We calculate daily, monthly, quarterly and yearly versions of
the dierent liquidity measures for each security. To obtain the market-wide liquidity variables
we take averages across all securities of the respective liquidity measure.
In the analysis we will also stratify the rms on the exchange, both by grouping by rm size
and by industry. When we group by size, at the beginning of each year we rank all rms by
their market capitalization (MCAP). We then quartile the sample by putting the 25 % of the
rms with the lowest MCAP in group 1, the next 25 % in group 2 and so on. Group 4 contains
the 25 % largest rms. The industry groups are based on the GICS standard.6 Initially, there
are 10 GICS industry sectors. However, we only look at the ve largest sectors in terms of
number of companies, since there are several GICS groups that contains very few companies.
The sectors we look at in this paper are Energy, Industrials, Consumer goods (discretionary),
Financials and IT.
Panel A of table 1 gives descriptive statistics for the sample. The liquidity of the OSE
has improved over the sample period 1980-2008, but has also varied across subperiods. From
Panel B we see that all the liquidity proxies are strongly positively correlated. Overall, the high
correlation between these measures suggest they contain some of the same information.
2.3 Macroeconomic data
To proxy for the state of the real economy we use real GDP (GDPR), unemployment rate (UE),
real consumption (CONSR) and real investment (INV). GDP is the real Gross Domestic Prod-
uct for Mainland Norway (excluding oil production). UE is the Unemployment Rate (AKU),
5We use all equities listed at the OSE with the exception of very illiquid stocks. Our criteria for ltering the
data are the same as those used in Ns et al. [2008a], i.e. that we remove years where a stock is priced below
NOK 10, and remove stocks with less than 20 trading days in a year.
6Global Industry Classication Standard was developed by Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) and
Standard & Poors. For companies that were delisted before 1997 there is no ocial OSE classication. We have
therefor manually reconstructed the classication of these companies for the period 1980-1997. A more detailed
description of the industry structure at the OSE for the period 1980-2006 can be found in Ns et al. [2009a] and
Ns et al. [2008b], and we refer to that paper for more details about the grouping procedure.
7Table 1 Describing liquidity measures
Panels A and B show descriptive statistics for the liquidity measures. The Norwegian sample covers the period from 1980
through 2008. The liquidity measures examined are the relative bid-ask spread (RS) and the Amihud [2002] illiquidity ratio.
The liquidity measures are calculated for each available stock once each quarter. Panel A shows the mean and median of
the liquidity measures, the number of securities used, the total number of observations (each security is observed in several
quarters), and estimates of average liquidity measures for dierent subperiods. Panel B shows correlation coecients
between the liquidity measures. The correlations are calculated across all stocks and time, i.e. the liquidity measures are
calculated for each available stock once each quarter, and the correlations are pairwise correlations between these liquidity
measures.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics, Liquidity measures
Means subperiods
Liquidity 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2008
measure mean median no secs no obs
RS 0.042 0.029 788 14942 0.041 0.046 0.040
ILR 0.772 0.205 770 15092 1.149 0.875 0.452
Panel B: Correlation coecients, liquidity measures
RS
ILR 0.40
CONSR is the real Households Consumption Expenditure and INV is real Gross Investments.
All numbers are seasonally adjusted. The data source is Statistics Norway (SSB). In the analysis
we dierentiate the macro variables.7
We also use a number of nancial variables which are shown in the literature to contain
leading information about economic growth. From the equity market we use Excess market
return (Rm), calculated as the value weighted return on a broad stock market index in excess of
a short term interest rate, and Market volatility (Vola), measured as the cross sectional average
volatility of the sample stocks. We also use the term spread (Term), calculated as the dierence
between the yield on a 10-year Treasury bond benchmark and the 3 month NIBOR interest
rate.89
2.4 Correlations
The correlations between the variables can be seen in table 2. The period we consider is from
the rst quarter of 1980 through the fourth quarter of 2008. Correlations that are signicantly
dierent from zero is in bold. Most notably is the very high correlation between Term and
the two liquidity measures (RS and ILR). This correlation is to a large degree driven by a
large decline in the term spread in 1992. At this time the short interest rate almost doubled
to 20% while the long rate was largely unaected. Also the spreads and price impacts in the
7dGDPR is the real GDP growth, calculated as dGPDR = ln(GDPt=GDPt-1). dUE is the change in unemploy-
ment rate, calculated as dUE = UEt -UEt-1. dCONS is the real consumption growth, calculated as dCONS =
ln(CONSt=CONSt-1). dINV is the real growth in investments, calculated as dINV = ln(INVt=INVt-1).
8The source of these variables is Ecowin/Reuters.
9We would also have liked to include a credit spread measure, since it was shown to be an important predictor
of real GDP growth for the US in Ns et al. [2009b]. However, a long enough time series of credit spreads is not
obtainable for the Norwegian market.
8Table 2 Correlations
The table shows the correlations between the variables we examine in this study. The period is from
1980-2008, and the data frequency is quarterly. Numbers in bold denote correlations that are signicantly
dierent from zero at the 5% level or better. Numbers in parentheses are p-values.
Market variables Macro variables





Rm -0.34 -0.15 0.21
(0.00) (0.14) (0.04)
Vola 0.47 0.43 -0.47 -0.63
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
dGDPR -0.27 -0.23 0.16 0.06 -0.02
(0.00) (0.02) (0.12) (0.58) (0.87)
dUE 0.42 0.35 -0.12 -0.07 0.09 -0.35
(0.00) (0.00) (0.26) (0.52) (0.4) (0.00)
dCONS -0.25 -0.18 0.14 0.15 -0.09 0.38 -0.23
(0.01) (0.08) (0.19) (0.14) (0.37) (0.00) (0.02)
dCRED -0.55 -0.51 0.16 0.04 -0.16 0.20 -0.12 0.07
(0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.72) (0.13) (0.05) (0.26) (0.50)
dINV -0.15 -0.13 0.14 -0.05 0.01 0.27 -0.06 0.02 0.06
(0.14) (0.20) (0.18) (0.61) (0.93) (0.00) (0.57) (0.87) (0.56)
equity market increased markedly indicating a dry-up in market liquidity during this event.
Another noticeable correlation is between the credit growth and the two liquidity measures,
which suggests that when credit growth is high, market liquidity is good (i.e. low RS and
ILR). This is what one would expect if credit growth reects an increased risk tolerance and
is accompanied by increased investments in equities. Another interesting result is that all the
nancial variables (Term, Rm, Vola) have a strong and signicant correlation with the two
liquidity measures. However, none of the non-liquidity nancial variables are correlated with
any of the macro variables. This result indicates that market liquidity contains information
about macro variables that is not reected in the other nancial variables.
3 The liquidity of the Norwegian stock market
3.1 Development in liquidity for the period 1980-2008
Let us rst examine the development in liquidity and activity proxies for the full sample period
for the market as a whole, for rm size groups and for individual industry sectors.
Market liquidity
We start with the liquidity of the whole market. In gure 1 look at the time series evolution of
the relative spread (RS) and the Amihud Illiquidity ratio (ILR). The left plot in the gure shows
the quarterly time series of the (equally weighted) averages. There are several things to note.
First, both variables are highly correlated. This is the case for many dierent types of liquidity
9Figure 1 Development in market illiquidity at the OSE (1980-2008)
The left plot shows the quarterly market liquidity at the Oslo Stock Exchange over the period 1980
through 2008. Market liquidity is proxied by the relative spread (RS) and the Amihud Illiquidity ratio
(ILR). Note that the gure plots the log of ILR for scaling reasons. The right gure shows the relative
spread for four size groups of stocks. Each group contains 25% of the listed securities. Group 1 (small
rms) contains the 25% of the rms with the smallest market capitalization, while Group 4 (large rms)
























































































































































































































measures. However, since various liquidity measures capture dierent sides of liquidity (e.g. RS
measures spread costs, ILR measures price impact/depth), they may also diverge in certain
periods. The second thing to note is that both series have a slight downward trend, suggesting
that both price impact and the spread cost has fallen over the sample period. This is also a
common feature of other liquidity measures as well as other markets, suggesting that implicit
trading costs have fallen over time. The third thing to note is that both series show a cyclical
pattern. This is similar to what is found for the US over a longer sample. We investigate this
feature of the data closer in the second part of the paper. Finally, we see that market liquidity
has worsened (an increase in RS and ILR) during the current crisis.
In the righthand picture in gure 1 we split the listed rms into four groups based on their
market capitalization, and calculate the average relative spread for each group. From the gure
for the size groups there are several things to note. First, we see that the level of the spread
is falling with rm size, which reects that large rms are generally more liquid and less costly
to trade than smaller rms. Second, the gure illustrates the strong commonality in liquidity
across sub samples of rms, as the liquidity of all groups are highly correlated. Thirdly, we also
see that a cyclical pattern is evident for sub-samples of rms. Finally, we see that the time
variation in liquidity is much greater, in absolute terms, for small rms than large rms. Also,
looking at the last few years, we see that the liquidity of the smallest rms (RS1 and RS2)
seems to worsen earlier than for the largest rms in groups 3 and 4.
10Figure 2 Development in turnover at the OSE (1980-2008)
The left gure shows the average quarterly turnover of the at stocks listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange
over the period 1980 through 2008. Turnover is measured as the volume of shares traded divided by the
number of outstanding shares in each stock. Thus, it measures the fraction of shares that changes hands
over the quarter. The right gure shows the turnover for four size groups of stocks. Each group contains
25% of the listed securities. Group 1 (small rms) contains the 25% of the rms with the smallest



































































































































































Turnover (all OSE stocks)
In gure 2 we investigate market activity, by showing the development of the average
turnover. In the picture we see that the average turnover for all stocks at the Oslo Stock
Exchange has increased over the sample period. While the quarterly turnover was varying
around 15% during the 1990s and rst half of the 2000s, it shows a marked decrease after 2005.
More specically, after a peak in 2005, turnover for 2008 was back to the level in the beginning
of 2000. Looking at the second plot in gure 2, where we plot the average turnover for the
four rm-size groups, we see that only the turnover for the largest rms have increased steadily
through the sample period. For the two smallest groups of rms the average turnover have had
large variation, and the turnover during the last few years has fallen to the level in the early
part of the sample (middle 1980s).
113.2 A closer look at the liquidity and trading activity before and during the
crisis period (2005-2008)
In this section we examine more closely the period 2005-2008. In addition to looking in more
detail at the rm size groups, we also examine how liquidity and trading activity of the dierent
industry sectors were aected by the crisis.
How does liquidity vary with rm size?
In gure 3, we show the development in liquidity (part a) and activity (part b) for the individual
years 2005 through 2008 for the rm size portfolios. The left diagram in part (a) shows the
average relative spread for each year for the four rm size groups, and similarly for the ILR in
the second diagram. For all size groups we see that both the relative spread and ILR increased
markedly in 2008 compared to the other years, although the increase is much less pronounced
for the largest rms in absolute terms. In part (b) of the gure, we look at two activity measures
(average quarterly turnover and average number of trading days per year). For turnover, we
see that there was a drop in turnover for all groups, except for the largest rms in group 4.
We can only speculate why we observe an increased turnover for large rms. One potential
reason for this pattern is that investors liquidated the most liquid stocks (large companies) to
free up cash during the crisis. We have some anecdotal evidence of this happening during the
periods when the equity market fell the most in 2008. The result that turnover for large stocks
increased at the same time as transaction costs increased illustrates the point made in Aitken
and Comerton-Forde [2003] that increased trading activity does not necessarily imply improved
liquidity.
When we look at the number of days that the rms in the dierent groups was actually
trading, we see a similar pattern as for turnover. There was a signicant drop for the smallest
rms (group 1 and 2), and an increase for the largest rms (group 4) in 2008. Thus, the
trading activity in small rms were clearly negatively aected by the crisis, while the large
rms experienced an increase in trading activity.
Table 3 shows the numbers associated with gure 3. In the last two rows in each panel we
have calculated the absolute and percentage change between the 2008 number and the average
for the period 2005-2007 which was a period with a large increase in equity values compared
to 2008. Looking rst at the relative spread and ILR, we see that the absolute change (di.)
was the largest for the smallest rms. E.g. for the rms in group 1 the costs of trading was
2.5 percentage points (0.025) higher in 2008 compared to the average over the previous three
years. This was an increase of 64 % in implicit transaction costs. Note also that the spread
captures the cost of trading a small volume at the best quotes. Thus, for larger trades the
implicit cost would be higher. We see a similar pattern for ILR. ILR reects the average price
movement caused by one NOK unit of trade. Since ILR is multiplied by 106 for scaling purposes,
the numbers in the table would reect the average percentage price movement (price impact)
from a trade of 10000 NOK. Thus, for the smallest rms a trade of size 10000 NOK in 2008,
would cause an average price impact of about 1 %. In comparison, the number was 0.04 %
12Figure 3 Liquidity and activity of rm size groups during the crisis
The gures in part (a) shows the average relative spread (RS) and illiquidity ratio (ILR) for each size
group for the years 2005 through 2008. Similarly, part (b) shows the average quarterly turnover and the
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13Table 3 Liquidity and activity for rm size groups (2005-2008)
Panel (a) and (b) of the table shows the average liquidity (measured by the relative spread and ILR) and
the average activity (measured by average quarterly turnover and average number of trading days) for
four rm size groups for the years 2007-2008. In the last two rows of each table we calculate the rst
dierence and percentage change between 2008 and the average of the period 2005-2007.
Panel (a): Liquidity
Relative spread Illiquidity ratio (ILR)
Year RS1 RS2 RS3 RS4 ILR1 ILR2 ILR3 ILR4
2005 0.038 0.028 0.012 0.008 0.394 0.240 0.049 0.020
2006 0.039 0.030 0.015 0.007 0.405 0.300 0.054 0.018
2007 0.043 0.031 0.014 0.007 0.488 0.277 0.050 0.014
2008 0.065 0.054 0.022 0.009 1.080 0.697 0.166 0.044
di. 0.025 0.024 0.008 0.002 0.65 0.42 0.12 0.03
%change 64 % 80 % 60 % 20 % 152 % 156 % 226 % 149 %
Panel (b): Activity
Quarterly turnover Trading days
Year Turn1 Turn2 Turn3 Turn4 N1 N2 N3 N4
2005 13 % 18 % 28 % 26 % 123 171 205 225
2006 11 % 17 % 21 % 34 % 134 166 202 228
2007 7 % 10 % 21 % 34 % 140 179 207 229
2008 3 % 5 % 16 % 36 % 99 160 203 232
di. -7 % -10 % -7 % 4 % -33 -12 -2 5
%change -73 % -68 % -31 % 14 % -25 % -7 % -1 % 2 %
for the largest rms. The relative increase in ILR in 2008 relative to the three previous years
was similar across size groups (around 150 %), except for group 3 there there was more than a
doubling of ILR relative to previous years. This may be due to group 3 containing certain rms
that were particularly aected by the crisis.
In Panel (b) of the table we see that the turnover declined for groups 1 to 3, while there was
an increase of 14 % in turnover for the group containing the largest rms. This development is
similar when looking at the number of trading days, where there was a decline in trading days
of 25 % (33 days) for the smallest rms.
14Figure 4 Liquidity and activity of industry groups during the crisis
The gures in part (a) shows the average relative spread (RS) and illiquidity ratio (ILR) for 6 dierent
industry groups (GICS) for the years 2005 through 2008. Similarly, part (b) shows the average quarterly




















































































































































































Are there dierences in liquidity across industries?
In gure 4 and table 4 we do the same exercise for the industry portfolios as we did for the
rm size groups. Looking rst at the relative spread and ILR in part (a), we see that both
liquidity measures increased for all groups except for Consumer goods. The sector with the
largest change was the Energy sector. This is probably related to the large swings in oil prices
during the crisis years. While we would expect the nancial sector to see the largest changes
in 2008, it does not stand out as being more aected than other sectors. In part (b) of gure 4
and table 4 we see that turnover and the number of trading days fell from 2007 to 2008 for the
Industry, Consumer and Financial sector, while there was an increase in turnover for Energy
and IT. Compared to the average turnover over the previous three years, we see in the last row
in part (b) of table 4 that the turnover was lower in 2008 across all industries.
15Table 4 Liquidity and activity for industry groups (2005-2008)
Panel (a) and (b) of the table shows the average liquidity (measured by the relative spread and ILR) and
the average activity (measured by average quarterly turnover and average number of trading days) for
the ve major industry groups at the OSE for the years 2007-2008. In the last two rows of each table we
calculate the dierence and percentage change between 2008 and the average of the period 2005-2007.
Panel (a): Liquidity
Relative spread Illiquidity ratio (ILR)
Year Energy Industr. Cons. Finance IT Energy Industr. Cons. Finance IT
2005 0.010 0.045 0.055 0.032 0.015 0.023 0.338 0.665 0.219 0.067
2006 0.014 0.055 0.044 0.036 0.023 0.057 0.291 0.611 0.234 0.170
2007 0.016 0.058 0.045 0.036 0.029 0.092 0.287 0.649 0.348 0.218
2008 0.030 0.080 0.047 0.054 0.039 0.281 0.821 0.584 0.693 0.473
di. 0.016 0.027 -0.002 0.019 0.017 0.22 0.52 -0.06 0.43 0.32
%change 120 % 51 % -3 % 56 % 77 % 388 % 169 % -9 % 160 % 211 %
Panel (b): Activity
Quarterly turnover Trading days
Year Energy Industr. Cons. Finance IT Energy Industr. Cons. Finance IT
2005 67 % 23 % 11 % 11 % 38 % 204 183 157 140 223
2006 38 % 20 % 14 % 9 % 29 % 210 182 156 152 189
2007 29 % 22 % 12 % 9 % 23 % 206 202 171 145 195
2008 31 % 11 % 11 % 6 % 26 % 197 176 167 140 180
di. -14 % -10 % -2 % -4 % -3 % -9 -13 5 -5 -23
%change -30 % -47 % -13 % -44 % -12 % -5 % -7 % 3 % -3 % -11 %
164 Predicting real economic variables with market liquidity
While the previous section looked at the development in liquidity during the current crisis, the
results in Ns et al. [2009b] suggest that market liquidity is informative about future economic
growth. Ns et al. mainly focus on the US market. It is interesting to see whether this result is
unique to the US. In this section we will therefore explore the predictive ability of stock market
liquidity for Norway.
4.1 In-sample evidence
We start by assessing the in-sample predictive ability of market liquidity for various macro
variables for Norway. The models we examine are predictive regressions on the form,
yt+1 =  + LIQt + 0Xt + ut+1 (2)
where yt+1 is the growth in the macro variable over quarter t+1, LIQt is the market liquidity
measured for quarter t, and Xt is a set of control variables observed at t.
We start by a very simple specication, with only market liquidity and the lagged dependent
variable as predictors for next quarter macro variables. In table 5 we show the results from
these predictive regressions. We see that regardless of choice of liquidity proxy, the coecient
on market liquidity () is highly signicant across all models and have the expected signs. A
worsening of market liquidity (increase in RS or ILR) predict a decrease in next quarter GDP,
consumption, credit, investment and an increase in the unemployment rate. We have also
examined models with dierent lags of the explanatory variables in addition to not including
the lag of the dependent variable. The size and signicance of the coecient on RS and ILR is
largely unaected by these variations in model specication.
Before we move on to a multivariate setting where we control for additional nancial pre-
dictor variables, we want to address the question of causation; i.e. does changes in economic
conditions aect market liquidity? We know from earlier studies done for the US that monetary
policy shocks have an eect on stock and bond market liquidity (see e.g. S oderberg [2008] and
Goyenko and Ukhov [2009]) while there is no eect of shocks to real economic variables on stock
market liquidity. On the other hand, neither of these studies examine the reverse causality of
whether there is a causality running from liquidity to real economic variables. We therefore
perform Granger causality tests between our two proxies for market liquidity and the dierent
macro variables. In each case we choose the optimal number of lags based on the Schwartz
Criterion. The results from these causality tests are shown in table 6.
In the rst part of the table, labeled "RS", we run causality tests between macro variables
and market liquidity measured by the relative spread (RS), and in the second part of the table
labeled "ILR " we perform causality tests when using ILR as our liquidity proxy. Looking
rst at the causality tests for RS and the dierent macro variables labeled in the rst column.
The column labeled "H0" states the null hypothesis. The next two columns shows the 2 test
statistic and the p-value respectively. Thus, in the rst test we test the null that dGDP does not
17Table 5 In-sample predictive regressions
The table shows the results from predictive regressions for dierent macro variables. The regressions
estimated are yt+1 =  + LIQt + 0Xt + ut+1, where LIQ is either RS or ILR, and the only element
in X is the lagged dependent variable. The rst column shows the respective dependent variables in the




^  ^ RS ^ 1  R
2 ^  ^ ILR ^ 1  R
2
dGDPR 0.023 -0.397 -0.243 0.12 0.012 -0.006 -0.225 0.11
(5.28) (-4.03) (-4.03) (5.99) (-3.04) (-3.69)
dUE -0.443 11.387 -0.150 0.12 -0.108 0.141 -0.080 0.06
(-3.94) (3.95) (-1.56) (-2.16) (2.49) (-0.82)
dCONS 0.016 -0.216 -0.153 0.03 0.011 -0.004 -0.142 0.04
(3.75) (-2.43) (-1.62) (5.85) (-2.72) (-1.49)
dCRED 0.013 -0.215 0.755 0.78 0.006 -0.003 0.784 0.77
(4.25) (-3.50) (15.90) (4.13) (-3.11) (16.97)
dINV 0.073 -1.686 -0.415 0.19 0.021 -0.018 -0.404 0.16
(3.79) (-4.01) (0.19) (2.23) (-2.44) (-4.94)
Granger cause RS, which cannot be rejected. The reverse hypothesis that RS do not Granger
cause dGDP is however rejected at the 1% signicance level. We see that this is the case for
all the macro variables. I.e. we cannot reject the null that any of the macro variable do not
Granger cause RS, while the null hypothesis that RS causes the macro variable is rejected at the
1% level in most cases. For ILR, in the second part of the table, we nd similar support for
a one-way Granger causality from ILR to the dierent macro variables, except in the case for
unemployment, where there is support for a two-way causality, and for growth in investments,
where there no causality either way.
In summary, the result that we cannot nd support for macrovariables causing market
liquidity is in line with the results for the US discussed earlier. However, we nd evidence of
a strong one-way Granger causality from market liquidity to macroeconomic variables. These
results are similar to the results found for the US in Ns et al. [2009b].
We conclude our in-sample analysis by adding a number of nancial variables to the set
of potential predictors. In the international literature, the most successful such predictors are
the term premium, credit spread, and market returns. To examine whether such variables also
predict economic growth in Norway, and whether liquidity contains additional information to
these variables, we extend the models estimated in table 5 to also include three additional
nancial variables, the term spread, a measure of stock market excess return (Rm) and stock
market market volatility (Vola).
In table 7 we present the results from predictive regressions when we add the nancial
18Table 6 Granger causality tests
The table shows a series of Granger causality tests between the two measures of market liquidity and
dierent macro variables. The Newey-West corrected t-statistics (with 4 lags) is reported in parentheses




2 p-value H0: 
2 p-value
(a) dGDP dGDP9 RS 2.58 0.11 dGDP9 ILR 2.52 0.11
RS9 dGDP 14.64 0.00
 ILR9 dGDP 13.83 0.00

(b) dUE dUE9 RS 0.38 0.54 dUE9 ILR 4.23 0.04

RS9 dUE 17.14 0.00
 ILR9 dUE 9.58 0.00

(c) dCRED dCRED9 RS 0.40 0.53 dCRED9 ILR 2.70 0.10
RS9 dCRED 10.51 0.00
 ILR9 dCRED 6.22 0.01

(d) dCONS dCONS9 RS 1.47 0.22 dCONS9 ILR 1.03 0.31
RS9 dCONS 3.84 0.05
 ILR9 dCONS 5.05 0.02

(e) dINV dINV9 RS 0.47 0.49 dINV9 ILR 0.00 0.99
RS9 dINV 8.46 0.00
 ILR9 dINV 3.17 0.07

variables as predictors (in addition to the lagged dependent variable). Looking rst at the
results in Panel (a), we see that the coecient on market liquidity () is highly signicant
for all models except for consumption growth where the coecient becomes insignicant when
adding the other nancial variables. While none of the other nancial variables have signicant
coecients, it should also be noted that when we run the regressions without the relative
spread included the term spread enters signicantly into the models for dGDPR and dUE.
However, the adjusted R-squared of the models are more than halved. Thus, although Term is
highly correlated with our liquidity proxies, there seem to be a signicant amount of additional
information in liquidity.
4.2 Out-of-sample evidence
In the previous section we found that market (il)liquidity had predictive power for economic
growth, for the whole sample period, for subperiods and when controlling for other nancial
variables that are found in the literature to be informative about future economic growth. How-
ever, in-sample predictability does not necessarily mean that the predictor is a useful predictor
out-of-sample. In this section we examine whether market illiquidity would have been useful to
forecast quarterly real GDP growth out of sample.
Methodology and timing of information
When setting up our out-of-sample procedure, we need to be careful about the timing of the
data so it reects what would have been available to a forecaster at every point in time. While
19Table 7 In-sample predictive regressions - additional control variables
The table shows the results from predictive regressions for dierent macro variables. The regressions
estimated are,
yt+1 =  + LIQt + 0Xt + ut+1: (3)
where LIQ is either RS or ILR, and the variables in X is the lagged dependent variable in addition to
the Term, Vola and Rm, with coecient estimates 1 for the lagged dependent variable, 2 for the term
spread, 3 for market volatility and 4 for the market return.
Panel (a) Relative spread (RS)
Dependent
variable (yt+1)   1 2 3 4  R
2
dGDPR 0.019 -0.361 -0.259 0.001 0.240 0.001 0.11
(3.11) (-3.43) (-4.25) (1.64) (0.62) (0.08)
dUE -0.358 12.365 -0.166 -0.007 -14.022 -0.183 0.11
(-3.20) (3.05) (-1.39) (-0.57) (-1.00) (-0.77)
dCONS 0.018 -0.115 -0.127 0.000 -0.738 -0.010 0.03
(2.83) (-0.97) (-1.33) (0.22) (-1.88) (-1.20)
dCRED 0.013 -0.186 0.765 0.000 -0.117 0.003 0.77
(2.50) (-2.22) (15.55) (-0.12) (-0.54) (0.41)
dINV 0.052 -1.325 -0.418 0.003 0.547 0.044 0.18
(1.56) (-2.66) (-5.03) (0.93) (0.24) (0.73)
Panel (b): Illiquidity ratio (ILR)
Dependent
variable (yt+1)   1 2 3 4  R
2
dGDPR 0.010 -0.006 -0.231 0.001 0.165 0.007 0.10
(2.36) (-2.26) (-3.42) (0.85) (0.45) (0.67)
dUE -0.012 0.145 -0.085 -0.007 -10.323 -0.335 0.05
(-0.14) (2.22) (-0.78) (-0.45) (-1.01) (-1.39)
dCONS 0.016 -0.003 -0.128 0.000 -0.732 -0.007 0.04
(3.71) (-1.68) (-1.32) (-0.02) (-1.85) (-0.92)
dCRED 0.006 -0.003 0.789 0.000 -0.096 0.006 0.77
(2.47) (-1.98) (16.39) (-0.27) (-0.40) (0.98)
dINV 0.011 -0.009 -0.404 0.004 -0.071 0.057 0.16
(0.50) (-0.80) (-4.96) (1.06) (-0.03) (0.88)
20the illiquidity variables and the other nancial variables are observable in real-time without
revisions, real GDP growth is not. First, there is a publication lag of one quarter for GDP.10
Secondly, there is an issue of later revisions in most macro variables. While the publication
lag is easily accounted for, the revisions are more tricky. Basically, the question is whether we
want to forecast the rst or nal vintage of GDP growth. This depends on the question we are
asking. If we were using macro variables to predict nancial variables (e.g. returns), we would
want to use the rst vintage (real time version) of the macro variable since the later vintages
(revised gures) would not be known to the forecaster (investor) when making his forecast.
However, since the question we are asking is whether nancial variables contain information
about expected economic growth, we want to forecast the last vintage. The argument for this is
that since the revisions mainly are due to measurement errors in the rst/early vintage series,
market participants expectations about the underlying economic growth should be unrelated
to ("see through") the measurement errors in the rst vintages. Thus, we want to forecast the
most precisely measured version of the macro variable, i.e. the most recent vintage series.11
In our out-of-sample analysis we consider both a rolling and recursive estimation scheme.
In both cases we start out with a window of 56 quarters (14 years). The width of the window
is chosen simply by splitting the sample period in the middle. Thus, our rst out-of-sample
forecast is made in the end of the rst quarter of 1994 for GDP growth for the second quarter of
1994. At the end of the rst quarter of 1994, we estimate each model using data from the rst
quarter of 1980 through the fourth quarter of 1993 (which is the most recent GDP observation
available to us at the end of the rst quarter of 1994). We then produce a forecast of real
GDP growth for the second quarter of 1994 based on the estimated model coecients and the
most recent observation of the predictor variable. In the case when the predictor variable is
market liquidity or any of the other nancial variables, these are observed for the same quarter
as we construct our forecast for the next quarter. Then, in the rolling scheme, we move the
window forward by one quarter, re-estimate the models, and produce a new forecast for the
next quarter, and so on. In the recursive scheme we add one quarter to the window, re-estimate
and produce a forecast. The last forecast is made at the fourth quarter of 2008 for GDP growth
for the rst quarter of 2009.
Evaluating out-of-sample forecast performance of market liquidity
We want to evaluate the out-of-sample predictive ability of market liquidity against several
baseline models. We assess the out-of-sample performance of liquidity against two types of
baseline models. The rst type of baseline model is an autoregressive model for GDP growth.
The autoregressive GDP model is the restricted (nested) version of a larger model where we
include both lagged GDP growth and liquidity as predictor variables. The second type of
baseline models include the dierent nancial control variables as predictors. In that case, each
of these models are then restricted (nested) versions of a larger model where GDP growth is
10Statistics Norway (SSB) releases the nal GDP gure for quarter t-1 in the last month of the following
quarter (t). Thus, at the end of t, a forecaster have the "nal" number available for t-1 GDP growth.
11Another issue is that rst vintage data for Norway is not available before the beginning/mid 1990s.
21regressed on the control variables in addition to the liquidity variable (RS or ILR).
We evaluate the forecast performance using two test statistics. The rst test is an en-
compassing test (ENC-NEW) proposed by Clark and McCracken [2001]. The ENC-NEW test
asks whether the restricted model (the model that do not include liquidity), encompasses the
unrestricted model (which includes liquidity). If the restricted model does not encompass the
unrestricted model, that means that the additional predictor (RS or ILR) in the larger, unre-
stricted, model improves forecast accuracy relative to the baseline model. Clark and McCracken
[2001] shows that the ENC-NEW test has greater power than tests for equality of MSE. The
ENC-NEW test statistic is specied as









where P is the number of out-of-sample forecasts, "r;t+1 denotes the out-of-sample forecast
errors from the restricted (baseline) model that excludes the liquidity variable, and "u;t+1 is
the out-of-sample forecast errors from the unrestricted model that includes liquidity, and MSEu
denotes the mean squared error of the unrestricted model that includes liquidity.
The second test statistic we examine is an F-type test for equal MSE between two nested
models proposed by McCracken [2007] termed MSE-F. This test is specied by




where MSEr is the mean squared forecast error from the restricted model that excludes liquidity,
and MSRu is the mean squared forecast error of the unrestricted model that includes liquidity.
Both the ENC-NEW and MSE-F statistics are non standard, so we use the bootstrapped critical
values provided by Clark and McCracken [2001].12
Market liquidity compared to an autoregressive model for GDP growth
First, we examine whether market liquidity can improve the forecast accuracy of an autoregres-
sive model for GDP growth. We consider an AR(1) model for quarterly GDP growth based on
tests for optimal lag length.13
When we compare the liquidity model to a benchmark model where we forecast GDP growth
with it's own lag, it is important to be careful about what information would have been available
to a forecaster at every point in time due to the publication lag of one quarter. Thus, the most
recent observation of GDP available to a forecaster at the end of the rst quarter of 1994 is
GDP for the fourth quarter of 1993. Thus, for the rst forecast, we estimate the autoregressive
model for GDP growth with data from rst quarter of 1980 up to and including the fourth
quarter of 1993, and then construct a forecast for the second quarter of 1994 based on the
12The bootstrapped critical values are available at
http:\\www.kansascityfed.org\Econres\addfiles\criticalvalues_tec.xls
13As additional justication for sticking to just one lag we nd that regardless of the number of AR terms,
only the rst lag is signicant during our sample.
22estimated coecients and the most recent GDP observation available, which is the nal gure
for GDP growth for the fourth quarter of 1993. The dierence to the case when we forecast
using nancial variables, is that we would observe the nancial variables up to the time when
we construct our forecast, which in this case would be at the end of the rst quarter of 1994.
However, we would still be limited to estimating the model up to the fourth quarter of 1993,
since that is the last GDP observation we have.
In table 8 we compare a restricted autoregressive model for GDP growth to several unre-
stricted models where the model also includes a proxy for market liquidity in addition to the
autoregressive term for GDP growth. In part (a) of the table we estimate the models in a
recursive (expanding window) scheme, and in part (b) we use a rolling (xed window) scheme.
In both cases we estimate the models using the rst half of the sample (56 quarters), and then
forecast GDP growth one quarter ahead re-estimating the models for each quarter. Looking
rst at part (a) we see that a model with either relative spread (RS), the relative spread for
the 25% smallest rms (RS S), the Amihud Illiquidity ratio (ILR) and the small rm version
of ILR (ILR S), has lower MSE than a model with only lagged GDP growth as the predictor.
Furthermore, we see that the relative MSE is the smallest for a model including RS. For all four
liquidity variables, the MSE-F test rejects the null of equal MSE's. The ENC-NEW encom-
passing test also strongly suggests that market liquidity contains additional information about
next quarter GDP growth compared to only its own lag. In part (b) of the table, where we
use a rolling estimation window, we see that all the models that include liquidity improve the
forecast accuracy over their restricted counterparts. Interestingly, the RS of the smallest rms
provide the greatest improvement in forecast accuracy.
23Table 8 Out-of-sample comparison - liquidity versus an autoregressive GDP model
The table compares the out-of-sample forecast performance for quarterly GDP growth of a restricted
model with lagged GDP growth as the only predictor variable against an unrestricted model where
market liquidity is included in the model. Part (a) uses a recursive estimation scheme, and part (b)
uses a rolling estimation scheme. The rst and second columns denotes the variables included in the
unrestricted and restricted model, respectively. The third column report the relative MSE between the
unrestricted and restricted models. The fourth column report the MSE-F test statistic and the last
column report the ENC-NEW statistic. For the MSE-F test, ,  and  denote a rejection of equality
of mean squared errors (MSE) between the unrestricted (MSEu) and restricted (MSEr) model, at the
ten, ve and one percent signicance level, respectively, in favor of the one-sided alternative that the
unrestricted model has lower MSE. For the ENC-NEW test the stars denote the signicance level of
rejection that the restricted model encompass the unrestricted model. Rejection of the null is in favor
of the alternative that market liquidity improves the accuracy of the restricted model.









S, dGDP dGDP 0.9042 6.25
 3.99





S, dGDP dGDP 0.9273 4.62
 2.90














S, dGDP dGDP 0.9578 2.60
 1.53

ILR, dGDP dGDP 0.9663 2.06
 1.24

24Market liquidity compared to models with other nancial variables
Next, we compare restricted models with the dierent control variables used in the in-sample
analysis (Term, Vola and Rm), to unrestricted models that also includes market liquidity. Ta-
ble 9 summarize the results from these model comparisons. Looking rst at the recursive setup
in part (a), we see that when comparing a restricted model with only ILR to a model that adds
RS, inclusion of RS signicantly improves the forecast accuracy. This is consistent with the re-
sults in table 8 where we found that RS had lower MSE than a model with ILR. The next three
model comparisons examine prediction models with the term structure (Term), market return
(Rm) and market volatility (Vola), and compare them to unrestricted models where RS is added
to the model. In all cases we nd strong evidence that RS improves forecast accuracy. When
using ILR as our liquidity proxy, we see that it does not improve a forecast model that only
includes Term. One important reason for this is probably the high correlation (-0:7) between
ILR and Term, indicating that both variables to a large degree contains similar information.
However, ILR still improve forecast accuracy relative to Rm and Vola. When we use a rolling
scheme in part (b), we nd much weaker evidence that market liquidity improves forecast ac-
curacy relative to other nancial variables. However, the ENC-NEW tests still suggest that the
models including RS improves the restricted models at the 1% level.
25Table 9 Out-of-sample comparison - liquidity versus other nancial variables
The table compares the out-of-sample forecast performance for quarterly GDP growth between a re-
stricted model with a nancial variable as the only predictor variable against an unrestricted model
where market liquidity is included in the model. Part (a) uses a recursive estimation scheme, and part
(b) uses a rolling estimation scheme. The rst and second columns denotes the variables included in
the unrestricted and restricted model, respectively. The third column report the relative MSE between
the unrestricted and restricted models. The fourth column report the MSE-F test statistic and the last
column report the ENC-NEW statistic. For the MSE-F test, ,  and  denote a rejection of equality
of mean squared errors (MSE) between the unrestricted (MSEu) and restricted (MSEr) model, at the
ten, ve and one percent signicance level, respectively, in favor of the one-sided alternative that the
unrestricted model has lower MSE than the restricted model. For the ENC-NEW test the stars denote
the signicance level of rejection that the restricted model encompass the unrestricted model. Rejection
of the null is in favor of the alternative that market liquidity improves the accuracy of the restricted
model.





RS, ILR ILR 0.969 1.861
 1.200

RS, Term Term 0.974 1.590
 1.003

RS, Rm Rm 0.963 2.243
 1.427

RS, Vola Vola 0.946 3.351
 2.087

ILR, Term Term 1.004 -0.246 -0.062
ILR, Rm Rm 0.967 2.015
 1.249

ILR, Vola Vola 0.979 1.245
 0.825





RS, ILR ILR 0.969 1.914
 2.880

RS, Term Term 0.991 0.541 1.536

RS, Rm Rm 0.997 0.206 0.459

RS, Vola Vola 0.952 3.001
 3.575

ILR, Term Term 1.041 -2.334 -1.011
ILR, Rm Rm 1.005 -0.281 -0.061
ILR, Vola Vola 1.009 -0.517 -0.143
265 Summary
In this study we have examined the information content of equity market liquidity. We rst
looked at the development of market liquidity during the recent nancial crisis. The results show
that both the implicit transaction costs (relative spread) and price impact (Amihud illiquidity
ratio) increased markedly at the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE), especially during 2008. Similarly
does turnover show a reduction in trading activity. When splitting OSE rms into size groups,
we nd more cross-sectional variation in liquidity and activity. First, we nd that the liquidity
worsened more for smaller rms at the exchange, although rms in all rm sizes experienced a
decrease in liquidity. When looking at the activity measures turnover and number of trading
days, we nd that all rm size groups, except the 25% largest rms, experienced a decline in
trading activity. Furthermore, the decline in liquidity and activity for the smallest rms is
evident already in 2007. This suggest a \ight to quality/liquidity" during 2007/2008, where
investors move out of small, less liquid and potentially more risky rms. The increased activity
in large rms is consistent with anecdotical evidence that investors were liquidating positions
in the largest and most liquid stocks. This because these stocks were the cheapest and easiest
to liquidate, while positions in the smaller rms would have been very expensive to liquidate.
We also split the OSE rms into industry portfolios. All industry sectors, except the con-
sumer goods sector, experienced a large increase in spreads and price impact in 2008. We do not
nd any evidence for nancial stocks being more aected by the crisis than the other sectors.
With respect to the activity of the dierent sectors, we nd that the turnover of rms within
the Energy and IT sector increased, while the turnover of rms in the Industy, Consumer goods
and Financial sector declined. For all sectors we nd that the average number of trading days
fell in 2008.
In the second part of the study we examined whether market liquidity contain information
about macro variables. This analysis is motivated by ndings in Ns et al. [2009b], where
they nd that market liquidity predict US GDP growth for the period 1947 to 2008, both in-
sample and out-of-sample. They conjecture that the common time variation in market liquidity
across stocks is related to portfolio rebalancing caused by changing risk preferences and/or
expectations about future investment opportunities. While there may be other explanations for
the result, a \ight to liquidity/quality" explanation is most consistent with the literature that
show that investors actions, represented by market-wide order-ow or risk premia, predict real
variables as investors alter their portfolios.
We perform both in-sample and out-of-sample evaluations of market liquidity as a predictor
of dierent macro aggregates. Overall, our results and conclusions are similar as those for the
US, although the out-of-sample results are weaker. Market liquidity is found to be a strong
predictor of quarterly economic growth. Furthermore, we nd support for a strong one-way
causality from liquidity to the macro variables. To evaluate whether liquidity would have been
of practical use for forecasting, we evaluate dierent forecasting models for quarterly GDP
growth. Compared to an autoregressive model for GDP growth, we nd that market liquidity
signicantly improves forecast accuracy when added to the model. We also test whether market
27liquidity is encompassed by models that use other nancial variables as predictors. The overall
result is that the relative spread contains additional information about GDP growth relative to
what is already reected in the term spread and market returns (market volatility). However,
when proxying market liquidity by price impact (ILR) we nd that the term spread encompass
ILR. The main reason for this is the strong correlation between the term spread and ILR.
To summarize, the results in this study indicate that market liquidity is informative about
the current and the future economic growth. For the purpose of nancial stability monitoring, it
may prove as a useful additional leading indicator to capture nancial stress or changing views
on the economy in real time.
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